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he processes of economic restructuring that began in the early 
1970s within many industrialized economies led to profound 
changes in the organization of work.  These changes include rising 
unemployment, the collapse of income security policies, and an increased 
individualization of economic risks, creating what European sociologist Ulrich 
Beck (2000) defines as a ‘political economy of insecurity’.  Growing 
precariousness in job tenure, and increased ‘flexibility’ for employers to 
determine conditions of work, are key characteristics in this contemporary social 
context. 
T
The organization of working time - time spent engaged in paid 
employment - figures prominently in these broader change processes.  Working 
time is a central concern in today’s labour market, as the conditions of ‘time 
flexibility’ that became familiar to Canadians during the 1990s - part-time work, 
more overtime, and a lack of control over work time - have had a negative effect 
on people’s capacities to balance work and non-work responsibilities and 
activities (Duxbury et al. 2003).  Recent research suggests that the economic and 
social impacts of working time re-regulation affect not only job quality and 
employment stability, but also gender equity and broader relations of social 
reproduction (Golden and Figart 2000).  Yet, while there is a growing body of 
scholarly research that examines the nature of changes to the organization of 
working time in both Canadian and international contexts, there are relatively 
few studies of workers’ responses to these processes.  To what extent are efforts 
being made to address working time change in a manner that promotes a balance 
between work and non-work responsibilities, as well as greater employment 
security and workplace equity?  What are the social and economic factors that 
promote and/or constrain such efforts?  What are alternatives to the 
predominant forms of employer-oriented ‘time flexibility’? 
This article explores these questions through a study of union strategies 
to re-regulate working time.  The article is based on a case study of the policies 
and strategies of four large unions, as well as a larger survey of working time 
provisions in major collective agreements.  The four unions chosen for the study 
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are the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), the Communications, Energy and 
Paperworkers (CEP), the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), and the 
Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE).  Combined, these unions 
represent over 1.1 million workers in a wide range of manufacturing, natural 
resources, communications, and public and private service sector occupations.  
In recent years, all four have engaged in strategies to increase workers’ capacities 
to better balance and control working time. 
 
RECENT TRENDS IN WORKING TIME – A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 
The ‘standard’ 40-hour workweek was normalized during the postwar period of 
economic growth, though primarily for male workers in large manufacturing 
industries.  Despite significant productivity gains during this period, weekly 
hours were not reduced below this norm, as such gains were translated into 
increased consumption, rather than increased leisure time (Schor 1991).  In 
Canada, average weekly working hours across industries and occupations have 
remained in the 35-to-40 hour range since the mid-1960s (Shields 2000).    In 2002, 
average weekly hours of work across all industries were 36.3, and across all 
occupations were 42.4.  Overall, close to 60 percent of workers had usual hours of 
35 to 40 per week, while only 9 percent worked over 50 hours per week and 19 
percent worked under 30 hours (Statistics Canada 2003a).   
 
TABLE I: 
Average Hours, Main Job, 2002 
 
Industry Hours Occupation Hours 
Agriculture 45.3 Occupations 
unique to 
primary industry 
45.1 
Construction 40.7 Management  42.4 
Manufacturing 39.7 Trades, transport 
and equipment 
operators 
40.9 
Health care and 
social assistance 
33.8 Processing, 
manufacturing 
and utilities 
39.5 
Education 
services 
32.6 Health 33.8 
Accommodation 
and food services 
31.0 Sales and service 31.2 
Source: Statistics Canada (2003a) 
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As Table I reveals, however, these averages mask an unequal distribution 
of working hours between industries and occupations.  Long hours are more 
prevalent in goods-producing industries and managerial and professional 
occupations, while short hours are more common in service-producing 
industries, particularly accommodation and food services.  Between 1976 and 
1998, the proportion of employees working the ‘standard workweek’ of 35-40 
hours declined, while the proportion of employees working either long (over 40 
hours) or short (under 35 hours) workweeks grew (Hall 1999).  This tendency 
produced a ‘work hours polarization’, which is segmented by industry and 
occupation.   
In addition to increased hours for some workers, working hours 
polarization has also been pushed by growth in service sector employment and 
nonstandard work arrangements, in particular part-time work, which is defined 
as working less than 30 hours per week.  Between 1978 and 1998, part-time 
employment grew from 15 percent to 22 percent of the Canadian workforce.  
During those years, part-time employment grew at an average annual rate of 4.5 
percent, while full-time employment grew by an average of only 1.2 percent per 
year (Statistics Canada 1999).  Between 1989 and 1998, the number of part-time 
employees increased by 16.1 percent, while the number of full-time employees 
increased only 2.4 percent (de Wolff 2000).   These trends continued in 2002 as 
part-time employment grew at a rate of 8.1 percent, compared to full-time 
employment at 2.7 percent (Bowlby 2003).   
These trends are highly gendered.  Consistent with other aspects of 
gender divisions within the labour market (see Armstrong and Armstrong 1994), 
there are pronounced gender differences in hours worked.  While women’s 
annual hours of work have increased significantly since the 1970s, and have 
contributed to an overall increase in average annual working hours, women’s 
hours of work are approximately 71 percent of those of men (Heisz and 
LaRochelle-Cote 2003).  In the mid-1990s, while only 7.1 percent of men worked 
fewer than 35 hours, approximately 30 percent of women worked shorter hours 
(Shields 2000).  Conversely, 24 percent of men, as compared to 8.6 percent of 
women worked long hours.  In 2002, average weekly hours for men were 38.2 
compared to 32.7 for women (Statistics Canada 2003b).  Overall, men are more 
likely to be employed in industries and occupations where longer hours of work 
are more prevalent, such as agriculture, construction and manufacturing 
(Statistics Canada, CANSIM II, table 282-0008, 2003-02-04).  Average hours of 
work are noticeably lower in industries where women are more predominant, 
such as educational services, health care and social assistance, and 
accommodation and food services.  Women are much more likely than men to be 
employed in forms of part-time work, comprising approximately 70 percent of 
the adult part-time workforce (Statistics Canada, CANSIM II, table 282-0002, 
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2003-02-04).  These gender differences in working time reflect the intersection of 
gendered divisions in forms of employment, and gendered divisions in 
responsibilities for social reproduction.  Clearly, while the labour market 
participation of women has increased dramatically in recent decades, equality in 
the distribution of working hours has not followed.   
In summary, while average hours of work continue to range around the 
norm of the 40-hour workweek in many industries and occupations, patterns of 
hours polarization indicate that the organization of working time is much more 
complex.  Further, working-time-related inequalities reflect gendered divisions 
of labour in both the labour market and the household.  Combined, these factors 
create a multi-faceted challenge for the re-regulation strategies of Canadian 
unions.  The remainder of this paper examines examples of these strategies, 
focusing in particular on strategies to (i) reduce hours of work, and (ii) promote 
‘employee-oriented flexibility’. 
 
TABLE II: 
 Union Policies and Strategies 
 
Union Reducing Working Time Employee-Oriented Flexibility 
Canadian Auto 
Workers 
-policy of reducing working 
time in order to save and to 
create jobs, and to provide 
time to participate in family 
and community activities 
- achieved through a 
combination of vacations, 
leaves, holidays and four-
day weekends, and early 
retirement 
- 80 annual hours of SPA 
(Big Three) 
- 7.5 hour day (Chrysler) 
- Employee-initiated alternate 
work schedules (Alcan) 
- telecommuting arrangements 
where mutually acceptable 
(Northern Telecom) 
- limits on the proportion of part-
timers in the bargaining unit 
(Canadian Airlines) 
- guaranteed hours for part-
timers (retail sector)  
- up to one year of leave for 
‘good cause’, including personal 
and family illness or accident 
(Chrysler)   
- shift trading arrangements (Air 
Canada and Windsor Casino) 
Communications, 
Energy and 
Paperworkers 
- goal of weekly hours 
below 40 and limits on 
overtime to combat job loss   
- Reduced Working Time 
Campaign in 2000 
- 37 1/3 in energy, paper 
and chemical sectors 
- 36 hour week (Bell 
Canada) 
- flexible working hours 
arrangements (Pasteur Merieux 
Connaught) 
- telework arrangements (Pacific 
Press, Bell Canada) 
- pro-rated benefits that are 
equivalent to full-time 
employees (Manitoba Telecom, 
Toronto Star) 
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- limits on OT in the event 
of layoffs (Avesta Polarit; 
Norske Canada Lafarge) 
- Family Leave Days 
(Saskatchewan 
Telecommunications) 
- full reinstatement following 
maternity leave (Pacific Press)  
- a seniority-based bumping 
procedure into an equivalent 
position if the employee’s 
original position has been 
abolished or substantially 
changed (IMC Kalium and 
Communications) 
 
Canadian Union of 
Public Employees 
- policy of bargaining, 
legislative change and 
enforcement, and coalition-
based activism  
- 32 hour work week 
(Quebec hospital workers)  
- overtime hours banks and 
‘partial’ leaves (Greater 
Victoria School Board; 
British Columbia 
Assessment) 
- grievable workload 
language 
(Catholic Children’s Aid 
Society, Toronto) 
 
- individual flexible work hours 
(start and stop) (Government of 
Saskatchewan) 
- guaranteed hours of work for 
part-time and seasonal staff (City 
of Winnipeg) 
- limits on split shifts (Greater 
Victoria Board of School 
Trustees)  
- requirement that schedule 
changes to the regular work day 
or workweek be made through 
mutual agreement (Manitoba 
Hydro)   
- expanded parental leave of up 
to one additional year (unpaid) 
(City of Winnipeg)   
- Primary Care Leave and family 
emergency leaves  (Air Canada, 
University of Victoria, Manitoba 
Hydro) 
United 
Steelworkers 
 
- policy to increase workers’ 
control over working time, 
achieve hours of work that 
promote a balance between 
work and family, reduce 
annual hours of work 
without reducing annual 
income   
- voluntary overtime and 
overtime time banks 
(Fording Coal, Highland 
- provide educational materials 
to members to promote work-life 
balance provisions  
- personal emergency or family 
leave (CIBC) 
- full reinstatement or provision 
of equivalent alternate work 
following maternity leave 
(Fording Coal) 
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Valley Copper) 
Sources: CAW (2002); CUPE (1995); HRDC (2000), Jackson (1998); Spinks and Moore (2002); USWA (1995); 
http://www.cep.ca/swtime_e.html. 
 
REDUCING WORKING TIME 
 
Reduced working time was one of the earliest issues around which 
workers in Canada organized collectively.  For example, the Nine-Hour 
Movement, which began in Hamilton in 1872, pushed for a reduction from 10 to 
nine hours of work per day to secure relief from overwork and work 
intensification, and to create time for ‘moral, social and intellectual 
improvement’ (Battye 1979; Kealey 1980).  The movement soon spread out of 
Hamilton, with Nine-hour Leagues forming in a number of larger cities in 
Ontario and Quebec (Heron 1996).  General strikes were to be used to create the 
pressure to win the nine-hour day.  The Toronto Trades Assembly passed a nine-
hour resolution and Toronto printers at The Globe struck to secure the nine-hour 
day in March 1872.  Employers generally refused to negotiate over reduced work 
time, however, and while some strikes were undertaken between March and 
June 1872, the movement quickly dissipated as these strikes were settled with 
wage increases, rather than reductions in work time.  Only small groups of 
workers – for example, skilled railway workers – actually achieved a nine-hour 
day during this period. 
The post-World War II bargaining priorities of organized labour 
contributed to the normalization of the standard workweek, with additional 
compensation for overtime hours, primarily for unionized male workers.  The 
structure of the labour market and the organization of working time have 
changed considerably in recent decades.  As discussed, there is a polarization 
between growing numbers of workers in nonstandard jobs who have little 
employment security, and others who are pressured by longer hours.  An 
employer-led offensive through the 1980s and 1990s to reorganize workplaces 
and work arrangements placed the labour movement on the defensive in general, 
and altered the context in which unions have sought to regulate working time.   
Nonetheless, the commitment to reduce working time remains a central policy 
goal within the labour movement.  The broader labour movement, through the 
Canadian Labour Congress, has a general policy commitment to promoting 
reduced working time through reduced overtime and a shorter workweek (CLC 
1999).  Within the unions under consideration in this study, some progress has 
been made in reducing and/or controlling daily and/or weekly hours of work 
within the collective bargaining process (see also Jackson 1998; Hayden 1999:121-
123).  The CAW has achieved its greatest success in reducing working time in its 
collective agreements with the ‘Big Three’ automobile producers (Ford, General 
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Motors, Daimler-Chrysler).  The first United Auto Workers agreement in 
Canada, which was negotiated with General Motors in the 1930s, reduced the 
standard workweek from 50 hours to 44 hours.  The standard forty-hour 
workweek was generalized in automobile manufacturing during the postwar 
years.  In more recent times, the CAW negotiated a 7.5-hour work day for eight 
hours of pay at the Chrysler minivan plant in Windsor, Ontario.  In the 1970s, 
CEP predecessor unions negotiated a standard workweek of 37 and 1/3 hours in 
the energy, chemical, and paper sectors.  By the mid-1990s, approximately 52,000 
CEP members had a standard workweek of under 40 hours.  Since its Shorter 
Work Time Campaign began, a number of CEP locals have reduced working 
time to below 40 hours per week.1    
Beyond negotiated reductions in daily or weekly hours, a variety of 
strategies have been undertaken to reduce working time, including vacations, 
leaves, holidays, early retirement, and overtime reductions.  A Big Three CAW 
member with between 10 and 14 years of seniority is entitled to a total of 360 
hours, or nine weeks, of paid time off per year.2  Full (mandatory) utilization of 
negotiated time off was incorporated into the Ford collective agreement in the 
1990s.  The CEP’s Shorter Work Time Campaign includes a goal of reducing 
overtime hours, including the use of overtime refusals to combat layoffs, and 
educational campaigns to encourage members to reduce overtime hours.  
Voluntary overtime, a condition in the CAW’s Big Three agreements for hours 
beyond 48, and in some USWA agreements, provides some means to reduce 
management control over extra hours.  Other strategies to reduce working time 
include overtime hours banks, whereby overtime hours are banked and then 
taken as time off at a later date, extended or sabbatical leaves, and in CUPE’s 
case, grievable workload language in the form of caseload caps.3   
These strategies vary considerably in terms of their capacities to actually 
limit hours of work.  For example, voluntary overtime is the least intrusive 
strategy, in that it neither places a limit on hours of work, nor provides 
incentives or protection for workers who refuse overtime.  Overtime banks are a 
somewhat more intrusive strategy, in that they ensure that extra hours of work 
are balanced with some time off, rather than simply paid for in extra wages.  
Strategies to explicitly reduce daily, weekly and/or annual working hours are 
the most intrusive in the scheduling of working time, and the most effective form 
of regulation, in that they create pre-determined limits to working time.  Thus, 
these strategies may also be the most difficult to negotiate.   
Despite the general policy commitment and the diverse collection of gains 
listed above, however, reduced daily or weekly working hours has not been 
widely established across the broader labour movement.  Table III reveals that 
approximately only one quarter of collective agreements stipulate a full-time 
workweek under 40 hours.  Blue collar workers are much more likely to have a 
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provision regulating a standard 40 hour workweek than are those in white collar 
bargaining units.  A very clear majority of collective agreements have no 
provision limiting the use of overtime.  Much more common are forms of 
working time reduction through additional time off.  A clear majority of 
agreements include a provision for ten or more statutory holidays, which 
exceeds general legislative norms.  Similarly, a large number of agreements 
provide four or more weeks of vacation for long service employees.  Some form 
of early retirement, a popular form of lifetime working hours reduction, is also 
common.  While the concept of working time reduction is most often associated 
with the reduction in daily or weekly options, both the union-specific examples, 
as well as the survey of collective agreements, reveal a diversity of approaches.  
A commonality is present, however, in the general paucity of provisions that 
directly reduce daily or weekly hours. 
 
TABLE III: 
Provisions in Collective Agreements4
 
Collective Agreement Provision % of Agreements with Provision, 
2002 
Normal Hours of Work, White Collar 35 hours – 9.6 
37.5 hours – 8 
40 hours – 3.2 
Normal Hours of Work, Blue Collar 35 hours– 2.5 
37.5 hours – 4.7 
40 hours – 47.7 
Clause Limiting the Use of Overtime 24.2 
Paid Holidays, 10 days or more 71 
Annual Vacation, 4 weeks 69.9 
Early Retirement 48.6 
Flextime WC – 9 
BC – 3.5 
Compressed Work Week WC – 12.1 
BC - 24.4 
Telework WC - 0.4 
BC – 0.4 
Work Sharing – Reduction in Hours to 
Avoid Layoffs 
3.2 
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EMPLOYEE-ORIENTED FLEXIBILITY 
 
The organization of working time has been dramatically affected by 
employer-oriented flexibility strategies.  Flexibility arrangements are often 
designed to meet employers’ productivity and profitability demands, rather than 
employee needs to balance work and non-work responsibilities.  However, work 
arrangements can be organized to promote forms of flexibility that benefit 
employees, in particular by providing scheduling options that allow full-time 
workers to meet family and non-work responsibilities (Clement 2001).  Examples 
of such arrangements include mutually agreeable flexible work schedules, limits 
on split shifts, and requirements that changes to the regular work day or 
workweek be made through mutual agreement.      
Table III reveals that there is a wide range of flexible scheduling options 
currently present in collective agreements.  White collar workers are more likely 
to have some form of ‘flextime’, while blue collar workers are more likely to have 
other forms of flexibility in scheduling, such as provisions that cover compressed 
workweeks, where regular hours are worked over a shorter number of days.  The 
table also reveals, however, that there are very few collective agreements that 
actually include these various provisions.  Similarly, very few blue or white 
collar collective agreements include a provision for telework, or for work sharing 
in order to avoid lay-offs.   
As discussed above, one of the key recent working time trends has been 
growth in part-time work.  In response, some unions have sought to establish 
collective agreement provisions that provide part-time workers with employee 
benefits and some measure of job security.  Notable examples listed in Table IV 
include guaranteed hours of work and pro-rated benefits.  Some unions, such as 
the CAW, also attempt to limit the proportion of part-timers in a total bargaining 
unit in order to prevent the erosion of working conditions through the increased 
use of part-timers.  While there are a range of provisions that have been 
negotiated for part-time workers, however, Table IV reveals that their 
application is limited.  For example, very few agreements provide for a 
minimum number of guaranteed hours, and fewer than one-third include 
provisions for holidays, vacations, sick leave, health and welfare benefits, a 
pension plan, or seniority.  This data clearly indicates that in collective 
bargaining priority must be given to improving the overall working conditions 
of part-time workers.  As well, due to the over-representation of women in part-
time employment, this data indicates that such efforts are essential to more 
general efforts towards gender equity. 
 
 
 
10   JUST LABOUR vol. 9 (Autumn 2006)   
TABLE IV: 
 Provisions for Part-Time Workers 
 
Collective Agreement Provision % of Agreements with Provision, 
2002 
Minimum Guaranteed Hours 8.8 
Holiday 28.6 
Vacation 30.4 
Sick Leave 22.5 
Health and Welfare Benefits 28.3 
Pension Plan 16.6 
Seniority 30.5 
 
On this last point, women’s increased labour market participation, the 
gendered inequities in the organization of working time, growing concerns over 
‘work-life conflict’, and women’s organizing within the labour movement have 
all contributed to a broadening of the working time agenda.  Strategies to 
promote ‘employee-oriented flexibility’ thus include strategies to provide 
specific benefits through time off for family care/social reproduction.   As 
maternity and paternity leave have recently been expanded through the federal 
Employment Insurance program and provincial labour standards legislation, 
collective bargaining plays a role in supporting and supplementing these 
benefits.  These include forms of leave such as extended parental leave, 
compassionate leave, bereavement leave, adoption leave, and child and elder 
care leave, as well as supplementary income top-ups for those on maternity 
leave.  Shorter-term forms of ‘family leave’ have been negotiated in order to 
assist employees with meeting daily and emergency family responsibilities.  Shift 
trading arrangements provide employees with the ability to address 
circumstances that may require attention during regular working time.  Finally, 
provisions that protect seniority and preserve benefits ensure that employees are 
not penalized for taking maternity leave.  These benefits are often preserved 
through reinstatement clauses that ensure an employee of their right to return to 
their original position, or an alternate equivalent position, with no loss in salary, 
seniority or benefits.  The existence of these provisions illustrates the impact of 
the feminization of the labour market on the collective bargaining process, and 
signifies union efforts to connect working time regulation to strategies for gender 
equity.   
As with other areas of working time re-regulation, however, these 
benefits remain provisional.  For example, while forms of short-term family care 
leave became much more common through the 1990s, this time off is most often 
in the form of unpaid time (HRDC 2000).  As well, fewer than 10 percent of 
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agreements provide leave for care of a child or parent, or extend leaves to same-
sex spouses.   While these benefits focus specifically on social reproduction, they 
are essential to a broader strategy of re-regulating working time in order to 
promote balance, security, and stability in a more generalized manner.  As the 
above analysis indicates, these goals have yet to be achieved. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the contemporary context, the labour movement’s historic goal of 
reducing daily and weekly hours has been supplemented with a much broader 
strategy based on regulating lifetime hours and promoting employee-oriented 
flexibility.  There is no central, coordinated, or common strategy to re-regulate 
working time within this broader framework, however.  The diversity of 
approaches reflects the diversity of the labour movement itself in terms of 
individual union priorities, histories, and memberships.  Even within the unions, 
other than specific examples from within the CAW and CEP, there is little 
centralization, as all four union strategies are premised upon promoting and 
supporting initiatives at more localized levels.  The variation in approaches to 
work time regulation also reflects the diverse character of the labour market with 
respect to work organization, in that some strategies to re-regulate time are to 
some extent industry- or occupationally-specific.  For example, a strategy such as 
flextime is more easily implemented in occupations where the work itself does 
not require a rigid, collective shift schedule.  Similarly, the approach taken to 
work time reduction – whether through daily, weekly, or annual reductions in 
hours – may be determined by industry-specific shift and production schedules.    
The union working time agenda has been in many ways shaped by the 
‘political economy of insecurity’.  Employers remain resistant to negotiating 
‘work-life balance’ provisions and working time ‘flexibility’ has generally been 
defined through employer-led restructuring efforts (Spinks and Moore 2002; 
Zeytinoglu 1999).  These initiatives, which occurred alongside government 
attacks on trade unions and the intensification of competitive pressures felt by 
Canadian workers due to globalization (Panitch and Swartz 2003; Broad 2000), 
have placed the labour movement largely on the defensive.  In this context, gains 
in the area of working time may take the form of simply resisting employer 
pressures to increase hours of work.  Further, working time issues have in some 
cases been traded off in order to prevent monetary concessions.5  Thus, employer 
resistance and concessionary bargaining limit the extent to which working time 
gains can be made.  
Related to the broader context of changing employment relationships is 
the lack of representation in many of the most ‘flexible’ areas of work.  As 
nonstandard forms of employment continue to grow, there remains a pressing 
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need to organize part-time and nonstandard workers and to increase their 
bargaining strength (DuRivage et al. 2000).  While the labour movement has 
made significant progress on gender equity in recent years, the need for further 
progress in the areas of benefits for part-time workers, as well as in the area of 
social reproduction, reflects the persistence of gendered inequalities, even in the 
collective bargaining context.  
The lack of centralized bargaining around working time also limits the 
gains that can be made.  Research on working time in Western Europe has found 
that working time is lowest where centralized collective bargaining is strongest 
(Lehndorff 2000).  Canada’s highly decentralized collective bargaining system 
places structural limits on the generalization of progress made by individual 
unions.  Further progress on working time issues may thus be aided by broader-
based approaches to collective bargaining.   
Finally, the prioritization of monetary gains over gains in working time 
reflects an uneasy approach to reduced working time within the labour 
movement, policy goals notwithstanding (Hayden 1999), as growing economic 
insecurity may also negatively affect the desire of union memberships to support 
reduced working time. Developing an approach to working time in the 
contemporary context requires unions to address wide ranging concerns of 
economic security, work quality, and workplace equity, concerns that at times 
may be perceived to be in competition with one another.   
Working time changes are central to broader patterns of change in the 
organization of work that began several decades ago.  These changes are 
contested by union strategies that provide some means to address growing forms 
of work-life conflict, place greater control over working time in employees’ 
hands, and that may contribute to greater labour market equity by incorporating 
social reproduction and security for part-time workers into bargaining agendas.  
However, for the reasons discussed above, such practices are still not widespread 
within the Canadian labour market.  Developing a strategy for working-time re-
regulation that promotes the goals of balance, equity, and control remains a key 
challenge for the labour movement in the ‘new economy’.   
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NOTES 
 
1  CEP Shorter Work Time Campaign, www.cep.ca/swtime_e.html. Retrieved 
July 11, 2003.  CEP petro-chemical workers in Sarnia, Ontario, CEP members 
at SaskTel and at Papier Masson in Quebec, and CEP Local 76, mill workers 
for Norske Canada, all work 37-and-1/3 hours workweek or less.  See also 
White (2002). 
2  CAW, “CAW Collective Bargaining Gains”, Union Awareness Course Notes, 
No Date.  This includes 100 hours of vacation, 56 hours of Christmas 
holidays, 72 hours in other annual holidays, 52 hours of Personal/Earned 
Absence Allowance, and 80 hours of Scheduled Personal Absence (SPA) per 
year. 
3  See HRDC (2000) for specific examples of such provisions.  For the CUPE 
example, see It’s Time to Declare Workplace Freedom Day, February 7, 2001,  
http://www.cupe.ca/www/WorkloadStories/4073 .  Retrieved June 9, 2003 
4  The data from Tables III and IV are from a sample of 1034 collective 
agreements covering 2,048,351 employees in both large (over 500 employees) 
and small bargaining units collected by the Workplace Information 
Directorate of the Labour Program of Human Resources Development 
Canada. 
5  This was the case in recent bargaining between Air Canada and the CAW in 
order to prevent the airline’s bankruptcy.  Virginia Galt, “CAW Standing 
Firm on Wage Rollbacks”, The Globe and Mail, August 20, 2003, B2 
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